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Challenging the Validity of Patents: Stepping in Line with EPO and US Jurisprudence 
 
Abstract 
 
As a matter of law patents are granted with a presumption of validity. However, with the public 
interest considered as an essential basis for the granting of exclusive rights, subject only to 
procedural fairness, a competent national or regional authority may revoke or invalidate any 
patent that fails to comply with formal patentability requirements as grounded in law. 
Remarkably, at the heart of most successful patent regimes lies a sensible framework that 
allows any interested third-party to challenge the validity of questionable patents except that 
these instruments are not found within the least developed patent regimes. Importantly, given 
the conceptual reasoning that invalidly granted patents stand to prejudice the overriding public 
interest, a principle centrally established in the patent system, this article examines the extent 
to which states can implement legislative instruments on patent opposition to mitigate the 
potential consequences of granting questionable patents. Therefore, drawing on the 
jurisprudence containing substantive law and procedural requirements of patent opposition 
proceedings within the EPO and USPTO, the author argues that citizens in whose interests’ 
patents are granted have the right to participate in the patent system and to check that only 
inventions that deserve exclusive rights are granted patents. The conclusion is that, if WTO 
members without patent opposition mechanisms were to explore and strengthen their regimes, 
citizens, competitors and other interest groups would be able to detect and invoke key 
provisions to challenge the granting of invalid patents, while maintaining that the patent system 
is untainted and free from questionable patent claims.  
 
Keywords: Patents, Opposition Proceedings, Public Interests, Questionable Patents. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The patent system was designed with the intention of promoting innovation, and the exclusive 
rights granted to patentees are subject to limitations.1 Monopoly rights confer on their owners 
the right to prevent others from carrying out certain acts, such as using, selling or importing 
patented products or processes without the patent owner’s consent.2 Mainly, the patent 
landscape is governed by the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO)3 Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),4 which provides adequate 
standards concerning the availability, scope and use and appropriate means for the enforcement 
of patent rights.5 As a matter of empirical logic, just as the patent system has its positives, there 
also exist social cost implications.6 The social cost aspect of the patent system is related to the 
notion of static efficiency losses resulting from monopoly and other market distortions, which 
can undermine the public interest.7  
 
                                                 
1 Reichman and Hasenzahl 2004, p. 13. 
2 § 271(d)(4) of 35 U.S.C. 1952. Dawson Chem. Co. v Rohm & Haas Co., 448 US 176, 215 (1980) in which the 
judgment recognised the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from 
profiting by the patented invention. See, Drahos and Braithwaite 2002, p. 151, explaining that the patent monopoly 
by its nature gave its owner strong rights over the making of the invention including the terms on which it could 
be licensed. 
3 The WTO Agreement 1994. 
4 The TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
5 Part II, Section 5, Article 27(1) of TRIPS. See, UNCTAD/ITE 1 1996, paras. 111−114. 
6 “Ayyangar’s Report” 1959, para. 38. 
7 Cotter 2013, p. 47. 
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Importantly, Article 8 establishes principles that underpin the entire TRIPS Agreement, and 
this provision captures well the need to protect the public interest.8 However, this is not 
automatic, and it does not exist in a vacuum.9 The central thrust is that while patent law 
provides the legal framework for the patent system, it does not define the scope of public 
interest in terms of a specific outcome. Keeping in perspective this understanding, several other 
features should support the patent system so that it works in the way that it is intended to work 
to promote this.10 To meet this objective, patent law should lay down some rigorous 
requirements, both procedural and substantive, for obtaining patents,11 in satisfaction of the 
public interest. Those requirements are fundamental to a well-functioning patent system, as 
they were created to ensure that only those inventions that are worth protecting for the purposes 
of facilitating innovation and meeting the broad public interest obtain patent protection.12  
 
Despite Article 29 of TRIPS setting out certain conditions that the applicant must satisfy a 
requirement to disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete,13 in reality, 
it may happen that a substantive examiner in the absence of lax patentability standards, as an 
instrument of government policy,14 may overlook a piece of prior art and advertently reach a 
positive decision regarding the patentability of the claimed invention.15 In other words, 
regardless of patent law normally having a general set of legal rules to govern the validity of a 
patent,16  even with the most rigorous examination system, the state cannot guarantee that the 
rights that it grants are valid, as there is always the possibility that a prior art may be overlooked 
or a specification misunderstood.17 That is, the increase in demand for patent rights places 
additional pressures on Patent Offices to examine and grant patent applications,18 and 
examiners may make mistakes in judging novelty or inventive step in the light of the state of 
the art that the patent search revealed.19  
 
Added to this fact is the argument that some applicants, with a view to obtaining exclusive 
rights, may submit questionable patent applications.20 The general meaning of a “questionable 
patent” relates to “poor quality” or any patent that has been granted improperly.21 Where this 
is the case, it will provide a workable basis for invalidating such patents given its presumed 
inconsistency with the general statutory requirements. These include novelty, non-
obviousness, usefulness,22 and the requirement of disclosure as grounded in the law against 
which patent applications are evaluated.23 Moreover, several grounds are often covered, which 
                                                 
8 Yu 2009, p. 1009, stating that Article 8(1) lays out the public interest principle in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Reichman 1995, p. 352, stating that TRIPS rules reflect compromise efforts to balance private and public interests. 
9 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, p. 70.  
10 ibid. p. 68, para. 255. 
11 WIPO, SCP/17/9 2011, p. 7, para. 22. 
12 WIPO, SCP/14/5 2009, p. 5, para. 18. 
13 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, p. 63, para. 266. See also, Beier 1990, pp. 255-256. 
14 Vawda 2013 (eds.), Abbott, Correa and Drahos, p. 293. Correa 2014 (eds.), Okediji and Reichman, p. 420. 
15 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, p. 56, para. 198. 
16 Burk and Lemley 2002, p. 1156. 
17 “WIPO Intellectual Property Hand Book” 2006, p. 208. See also, UN. A/HRC/11/12 2009, para. 52. 
18 Burk and Lemley 2009, p. 25. 
19 Drahos 2010, p. 72. See also, “WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, p. 56, para. 201. 
20 Manu 2015, p. 403. 
21 Note that there is no universally accepted term for patents that are issued by the Patent Office but do not meet 
the statutory standards for patents, and different sources refer to them with different terms. For instance, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Report 2003, ch. 5, p. 1 refers to such patents as ‘improvidently granted patents 
or patents of improper breadth’. See also, Shapiro 2004, p. 1018.  
22 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000). See, Williams 2006, parts II. 
23 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
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commonly include: suppression of information about foreign filing, and anticipation having 
regard to traditional knowledge.24 Traditionally, opposition proceedings have been limited to 
competitors and governments.25 The government can challenge issued patents and even revoke 
them.26 However, such government-led actions are currently rare.27 Notably, several countries 
have broadened this to include interested persons, such as civil society organisations.28 
 
Consequently, where the patent system allows too many questionable patents to prevail, 
without offering an inexpensive and timely mechanism for invalidation, such a regime will not 
be fit for purpose, as it ignores the social benefit gained by granting patents, and overlooks the 
fundamental fact that patents are for the benefit of the public.29 It is on this foundation that 
several countries continue to take policy decisions that allow opposition proceedings to restrain 
the granting of questionable patents and claim a right over the same.30 The problems associated 
with the existence of questionable patents, and the need for an effective, inexpensive legislative 
vehicle for challenging them is not an entirely new norm to the patent system.31 Importantly, 
the patent validity challenge is not an accident or a mistake; rather, it is an inherent part of our 
patent system.32 No international treaty sets standards on the general framework of patent 
opposition mechanisms as such.  
 
Importantly, some general procedural requirements prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement, and 
the Patent Law Treaty (PLT)33 may also be applicable to opposition procedures. The attitude 
of these two treaties is, via the international accepted standards, to remind states of the guiding 
principles of fundamental fairness that must be the hallmark of opposition proceedings rather 
than to strictly prescribe a constitutive approach to the same. To take an illustration of this, 
Articles 32 and 62 of TRIPS and the PLT Article 10(2) leave open cases in which signatory 
states can exercise wider discretion on this subject matter.34 Under the framework of TRIPS, 
the Agreement does not state specifically the grounds upon which members should provide 
opposition mechanisms.35 Therefore, members are free to provide, or not to provide, an 
opposition mechanism in their national laws,36 except that the most successful patent regimes, 
such as the European Union (EU),37 the United States (US),38 Japan39 and India,40 which uphold 
the notion of public interest protection, allow for some form of opposition mechanism.  
                                                 
24 Stauder and Singer 2003, p. 125.  
25 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, para. 51. 
26 Section 66 of the Indian Patent Act 1970 (No. 39 of 1970, as amended) “revocation of patent in public interest”. 
27 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 90. 
28 Section 25 of the Indian Patent Act 1970. 
29 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
30 Puasiri 2013, p. 223.  
31 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 95. 
32 Park, 2010, p. 108. 
33 Patent Law Treaty 2000. 
34 Taubman, Wager and Watal (eds.) 2012, p. 115.  
35 Gervais 2012, p. 178. 
36 WIPO, SCP/14/5 2008, p. 7, para. 27. 
37 “Convention on the Grant of European Patents” 1973, OJ of EPO 2001, p. 55). “Implementing Regulations to 
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents” 1973, last amended 2014. 
38 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 321 - post-grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 311 - inter partes 
review. 
39 Patent Act of Japan 1959, Ch. V, Articles 113 & 123. 
40 Section 25 of the Indian Patent Act 1970. 
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Nevertheless, these instruments of contestation are not common in some countries,41 or may 
be highly ineffective in countries where they exist,42 whereas a conceivable reality is that a 
high number of questionable patents may be being issued by Patent Offices and, at the same 
time, many of them are not being invalidated.43 Importantly, given the conceptual reasoning 
that invalidly granted patents stand to prejudice the overriding public interest, a principle 
centrally established in the patent system, this article examines the extent to which states can 
implement legislative instruments on patent opposition to mitigate the potential consequences 
of granting questionable patents. Therefore, drawing on the jurisprudence containing 
substantive law and procedural requirements of patent opposition proceedings within the EPO 
and USPTO, the author argues that citizens in whose interests’ patents are granted have the 
right to participate in the patent system and to check that only inventions that deserve exclusive 
rights are granted patents. The conclusion is that, if WTO members without patent opposition 
mechanisms were to explore and strengthen their regimes, citizens, competitors and other 
interest groups would be able to detect and invoke key provisions to challenge the granting of 
invalid patents, while maintaining that the patent system is untainted and free from 
questionable patent claims. 
 
II. Deficient Prosecution and the Grant of Questionable Patents 
 
A common normative belief in the patent system is that patents are normally granted to protect 
genuinely new and inventive products and processes.44 Notwithstanding this, patents are not 
awarded automatically but rather, they must be applied for and will only be granted if the 
examiner in the Patent Office, via the prosecution process, considers that the application meets 
all of the necessary legal requirements; the key requirements, as already mentioned, are that 
the invention is novel and not obvious.45 Some countries have adopted strict patentability 
criteria regarding what does and does not deserve a patent, via the prosecution process.46 The 
common theme of this stringent system is based on the notion that the lower the quality of 
patents, the greater the fraction of rights that have been improperly issued, and the less efficient 
the patent system is at stimulating innovation and promoting the public interest.47  
 
However, it is important to keep in mind that even when a Patent Office has strict standards 
for patentability during patent prosecution, there is no guarantee that they will be adequately 
applied; put differently, such mechanisms are far from perfect.48 In a general legal 
sense, prosecution has a different context in IP law; it is the process of writing and filing 
a patent application and pursuing protection for the patent application with the Patent Office.49 
Put differently, it is the stage between the filing of a patent application and its final disposition. 
This involves the entire administrative procedure through which a patent application becomes 
                                                 
41 Williams 2006, parts II.C, II.E. 
42 For example, the national legislation of Uganda and Tanzania-Zanzibar provides for pre- and post-grant 
administrative opposition procedures. See, Section 28(7)-(12) Section 32(5) & (6) of the Uganda Industrial 
Property Act, 2013 & Sections 10(7)(a) and 16 of the Zanzibar Industrial Property Act of 2008. Burundi only 
provides for pre-grant administrative opposition procedures. See also, Article 47 and 48 of Law No. 1/13 of July 
28, 2009 relating to Industrial Property in Burundi. Article 16 of the Egyptian Law on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights 82 of 2002 provides for only pre-grant opposition. The other African countries have neither pre-
grant nor post-grant opposition mechanisms. 
43 Shapiro 2004, p. 1028, citing costs as one of the limitations. 
44 Correa 2007a, p. viii. 
45 Murray 2016, p. 227. 
46 Correa 2007a, p. 3. 
47 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 77. 
48 Carrier 2011, p. 105. 
49 FTC Report 2003, p. 27. 
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a patent. However, patent examination is an ex parte proceeding between the Patent Office 
examiner and the applicant.50 It does not therefore seem sensible, following this one-sided 
procedure, to treat every granted patent as though it has always met some higher standards of 
patentability.51 Central to this debate is the pervasive and growing concern that the Patent 
Office grants far too many questionable patents, which, were they to be subjected to a thorough 
review, would be likely to be found invalid.52  
 
The causes of poor quality examination at the Patent Office are manifold and well documented 
in the literature.53 Frequently cited reasons include: inadequate Patent Office resources to 
thoroughly review each application, biased procedures that favour the patent applicant or 
skewed incentives that make it easier for an examiner to allow an application rather than reject 
it.54 These general insights shift the conventional view in a subtle but, importantly, 
understandable way and it becomes clear that the quality of a patent depends on the underlying 
examination at the Patent Office.55 The patent rules of practice and administrative regulations 
are the genesis of the problem, and driving this are evidentiary mechanisms that include 
presumptions and shifting burdens of proof.56 Put differently, this problem often flows directly 
from key administrative practices and operating procedures, whereby there is a strong 
presumption that an adequate written description of the claimed invention is present when the 
application is filed.57  
 
This presumption obliges the Patent Office examiner to treat as true the patent applicant’s 
assertions, or documentary evidence that is filed regarding certain facts in relation to the 
asserted usefulness of the invention; unless countervailing evidence can be provided to dismiss 
the accuracy or reliability of such information then there is no legitimate basis to doubt the 
credibility of such an application.58 Under these constricted substantive and procedural 
environments, a patent applicant enjoys a presumption of patentability.59 That is, at the time of 
filing, the application is rebuttably presumed to comply with the utility, novelty, non-
obviousness, and disclosure requirements of the patent law.60  This presumption allocates the 
burden of proof to the contrary, and it commonly tends to favour the issuance of a patent unless 
the Patent Office can establish a prima facie case for rejection of the patent application.61 Thus, 
the burden of proving unpatentability rests with the Patent Office.62 Under this conceptual 
logic, the Patent Office must issue a patent unless it can affirmatively prove that the invention 
is unpatentable.63  
 
                                                 
50 ibid. p. 9. 
51 ibid. p. 10. 
52 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 83. Lemley and Sampat 2008, p. 192, estimating that over 70 per cent of 
applications eventually issue as patents. 
53 Kesan 2002, pp. 765-766.  
54 Shi 2003, p. 435. Burk and Lemley 2009, p. 25. 
55 FTC Report 2003, p. 19. 
56 Durham 2009, § 5.1. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1. 
58 USPTO (2001) Utility Examination Guidelines. p. 1098- 99. 
59 A presumption is an assumption that must be drawn by the decision-maker in the absence of rebuttal evidence. 
See, Wigmore 1981, § 2491 (ed) Chadbourn, p. 305. 
60 Seymore 2013, p. 995 & 997. 
61 In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968).  
62 In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993), finding that an examiner must affirmatively prove 
unpatentability. 
63 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992), if examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima 
facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to the granting of the patent. 
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This presumption is seen by many as preserving the strength of patent applications given that 
this presumption is not to be overthrown, except by clear and cogent evidence that tilts the 
presumption.64 The scales are therefore tipped even further towards issuance if the examiner 
lacks the time, materials or incentives to conduct a high-quality examination.65 The bottom line 
is that anyone who files a patent application for anything starts off in a very good position.66 
Added to the foregoing assumption is the norm that an issued patent is presumed valid, and the 
courts require a party that challenges a patent to prove its invalidity with clear and convincing 
evidence to overturn that presumption.67 Perhaps the most important threshold requirement to 
invalidate a questionable patent is to establish that the claimed invention does not meet one or 
more of the patentability criteria.68 Still, the risk that a patent will surely be declared invalid is 
unpredictable.  
 
Even though the patent applicant owes a duty of candor to the Patent Office,69 no-one believes 
that everything that the applicant knows about the invention ends up before the examiner 
despite a legal obligation on the patent applicant to disclose information material to 
patentability.70 Moreover, that duty does not require an applicant to search for prior art beyond 
that about which he already knows. We learn immediately that if the examiner does not produce 
a prima facie case (of obviousness), then the applicant is under no obligation to submit 
evidence of non-obviousness.71 Of course, the information deficit inevitably allows 
questionable patents to be granted. This difficult position is compounded by the fact that while 
the examiner may be aware of potential abuse, they often cannot lawfully reject an application 
on the grounds of poor disclosure, except in extreme cases.72 Several cases in which “patent 
trolls” and clear abuses of the system have occurred over the years, especially in the US, have 
shown that applicants in bad faith can take advantage of the mild enforcement of the duty of 
disclosure, and scholars have extensively discussed this problem.73 
 
Likewise, the US Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that the USTPO “does not 
investigate” duty of disclosure issues and “does not . . . reject” applications on that basis.74 
Within this notion, even if sound patent policy calls for targeted legislative intervention to 
sanitise the patent system, then this may not be a fruitful exercise at times.75 Moreover, patent 
examiners’ tasks are particularly challenging if the technological or scientific frontier is 
moving fast, and if relevant information has not yet been included fully in the written material 
                                                 
64 Miller 2004, 689, stating that the Patent Office appears to grant many patents that, when carefully scrutinised, 
fail to meet basic patentability standards. 
65 Long 2002, pp. 667-668, observing that the constraints of time, information, and evidentiary standards create a 
situation where the Patent Office’s evaluation of a patent application may be so poor or hurried as to be near 
meaningless. Leslie 2006, p. 109. Shapiro 2004, p. 1019. 
66 FTC Report 2003, ch. 5, p. 9, finding that Patent applicants are in a great position because by filing an 
application they are presumptively entitled to receive the grant.  
67 ibid. p. 8. 
68 ibid. p. 9. 
69 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012). 
70 ibid. § 1.56. A duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Patent Office include a duty to disclose to the 
Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability. See, Seymore 2013, p. 1011, 
footnote 131. 
71 USPTO (2015) Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. § 2142. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 
(CCPA 1976); In re Saunders, 444 F.2d 599, 170 USPQ 213 (CCPA 1971). 
72 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
73 Lemley and Shapiro 2007, pp. 1991- 2049. Rogers and Jeon 2014, pp. 291-337. 
74 See, USPTO (2001) Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. § 2010, explaining that such PTO determinations 
‘would significantly add to the expense and time involved in obtaining a patent with little or no benefit to the 
patent owner or any other parties with an interest’. 
75 Farrell and Shapiro 2008, p. 1362. 
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that they are using to understand the state of the art.76 Another challenging aspect is the 
mounting number of patent applications that the Patent Office must examine, and this could 
lead to the granting of questionable patents.77 Professor Wagner flags this quite clearly: as ‘the 
amount of patenting activity has grown rapidly worldwide, the administrative apparatus of the 
patent system has been strained to its limits’,78 thereby emphasising the claim that the reason 
why we have questionable patents is because ‘the incentives to file low-quality patents are too 
high, and the incentives to file high-quality patents are too low’.79  
 
This is relevant, as hundreds of thousands of applications filed each year end up having no 
commercial significance.80 Where the Patent Office’s resources to evaluate patent applications 
seem inadequate, such as an underfunded Patent Office, then there may not be sufficient time 
to evaluate patent applications fully or to allow efficient and accurate screening of all patent 
applications.81 This has contributed to an extensive debate in which experts have mapped out 
policy reforms to nurture the quality of patents.82 Scholarly debates have categorised reforms 
into five broadly defined themes: administrative changes, patent law changes, better patent 
information to patent applicants and examiners, better incentives to improve patent quality and 
more technical advancement for patent examiners.83 However, as Professor Miller has argued; 
‘even if the Patent Office were to invest far more in reviewing applications, its review would 
still suffer from a basic knowledge deficit compared to that which well-informed inventors and 
their competitors possess’.84  
 
Importantly, Professor Lemley balances accuracy and operational overheads, and argues 
persuasively in support of the viewpoint that strengthening the examination process is not cost 
effective, and society is better off spending its resources on a more searching judicial inquiry 
into validity in those few cases in which it matters, rather than paying for a more protracted 
examination of all patents ex ante.85 In the narrative, he states that while maintaining a check 
on the quality of patents is the most vital consideration for any Patent Office,86 an opposition 
system seems to be an efficient way of providing an additional layer for checking any errors 
and abuse in the patent system to ensure the quality of patents.87  
 
III. Challenging the Validity of Patents: Jurisprudence of the EPO and US  
 
Most of the successful patent regimes have statutory mechanisms whereby an interested third-
party can express his opposition against the granting of a patent or against a granted patent.88 
In general, opposition proceedings are conducted before the Patent Office, and not a court per 
                                                 
76 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 1014. 
77 Thomas 2002, p.729. 
78 Wagner 2009, p. 2137. 
79 ibid. p. 2172. 
80 Farrell and Shapiro 2008, p. 1361. 
81 id. 
82 Scellato et al. 2011, p. 107. 
83 Wagner 2009, p. 2173. White 2004, p. 80. Shang 2009, p. 200. Pottelsberghe 2009, p. 49. 
84 Miller 2004, 733. 
85 Lemley 2001, p. 1497.  
86 Scellato et al. 2011, p. 106. 
87 Lemley 2008, pp. 32-33. See also, Stanton et al. 2005, p. 40. 
88 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 321 - post-grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 311 - inter partes 
review. “Convention on the Grant of European Patents” 1973, OJ of EPO 2001, p. 55). “Implementing 
Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents” 1973, last amended 2014. Patent Act of Japan 
1959, Ch. V, Articles 113 & 123.  
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se.89 An opponent must allege at least one of the grounds for opposition among those that are 
prescribed in the applicable law.90 Opposition procedures are closely related to the patent 
granting procedure. An opposition may be requested soon before the granting of a patent (pre-
grant opposition) or after the granting of a patent (post-grant opposition).91 In some countries, 
an opposition may be filed within a certain time immediately after the publication of the 
application for a patent and before the examination phase, in which case the procedure 
resembles, to a certain extent, the so-called third party observation system.92 It is possible to 
combine pre-grant and post-grant opposition systems.93  
 
The advantage of having a pre-grant opposition system is that it precludes questionable patents 
from being granted at an early stage and may also be beneficial for a patentee, since the patentee 
and the public can have more trust in the validity of the patent.94 However, a common drawback 
of a pre-grant opposition system is that it may cause a substantial delay in the whole process 
of finalising the granting of a patent,95 in the end, stifling technological progress and causing 
economic harm.96 Similarly, the major shortcoming of a post-grant opposition system is that it 
leads to the wrongful monopoly of a patent holder until the time at which an opposition is filed 
for the patent. While such laws differ in terms of their substantive construction and the general 
procedural requirements, their legal logic is similar. The common objective is to provide a 
simple, quick and inexpensive means to increase patent quality by providing additional input 
to the process to ensure that undeserving patent are not granted exclusive rights.97  
 
These mechanisms also provide an alternative to potentially lengthy and costly judicial 
proceedings, since the current patent system has a de facto reliance on litigation as the primary 
vehicle for invalidating patents - a reliance that has adverse public consequences.98 It is worth 
noting that no international treaty regulates post-grant patent opposition mechanisms as such,99 
and there are operative provisions in the current patent regime, specifically dealing with the 
regulation of opposition procedures, which consider what was set forth on procedural matters 
                                                 
89 WIPO, SCP/14/5 2009, para. 12.  
90 In the EPO, where the subject-matter of the European patent is not patentable under Articles 52 to 57 because 
it is not new (Articles 52(1), 54, 55); does not involve an inventive step (Article 52(1), 56); is not susceptible to 
industrial application (Articles 52(1), 57); is not regarded as an invention under (Article 52(1)-(3) or is not 
patentable under Article 53. Additional grounds are that the European patent does not disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (Article 83) or the 
subject-matter of the European patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed (Article 123(2)) or, 
if the patent was granted on a divisional application or on a new application filed under Article 61 (new application 
in respect of the invention by the person adjudged in a final decision to be entitled to the grant of a European 
patent), beyond the content of the earlier application as filed (see, Article 76(1)). 
91 WIPO, SCP/17/9 2011, p. 5, para. 15. 
92 PCT: PCT/AI/17 2016, p. 66, Part 8, Section 810, Third Party Observation System. 
93 India, for example, provides both a pre-grant and a post-grant opposition system. Section 25 of the Indian Patent 
Act 1970. 
94 Manu 2015, p. 409, observing that pre-grant opposition is cheaper, simpler and faster and can therefore be an 
effective means to help ensure that only high-quality patents are granted. 
95 Drahos 2010, p. 163. 
96 WIPO, SCP/17/9 2011, p. 10, para. 29, observing that since anyone can file an opposition, a great number of 
oppositions could be filed in complex cases. Footnote 13, finding that, for example, the Oncomouse case (EP 
0169672) received 17 oppositions, and the Edinburgh/stem cells case (EP 0695351) received 14 oppositions. See, 
Harhoff and Reitzig 2004, p. 444.  
97 Chien and Lemley 2012, p. 28. See also, WIPO, SCP/14/5 2009, p. 5, para. 18. 
98 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 1014. 
99 WIPO, SCP/17/9 2011, p. 13, para. 37. 
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in general under TRIPS,100 and within the PLT.101 This paucity thereby leaves WTO members 
free to decide on the matter. Under this logic, and consistent with WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding findings, each state creates its own regime, and these laws emphasise the 
overriding character of national patent policies, which are essentially the result of the legal 
vacuum created by the international treaty,102 leaving members free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing opposition mechanisms within their own legal system and 
practice.103 Both the European and US patent regimes support patent opposition instruments.  
 
Under US patent law, an opposition proceeding is called a reexamination.104 Originally, there 
were two types of reexamination procedure in the US and these requests fall into one of two 
categories: inter partes reexaminations, which allow the requesting party to participate in the 
proceedings; and ex parte reexaminations, which are conducted substantially exclusively 
between the patent owner and the United States Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO).105 
However, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act introduced post-grant review proceedings into 
US patent law, by adding a new Chapter 32 to Title 35 of the United States Code.106 Although 
prior to this the US patent law permitted a form of post-grant review of issued patents through 
reexamination proceedings,107 the reexamination proceedings were limited to issues of 
patentability relating to prior art patents or printed publications that establish “a substantial 
new question of patentability”.108  
 
The America Invents Act significantly expands these options, by providing a new post-grant 
review proceeding, which is, in many respects, similar to foreign opposition mechanisms.109 In 
other words, the America Invents Act reformed inter partes reexamination proceedings with 
two different types of administrative post-grant proceedings: post-grant review and inter partes 
review.110 Under the new America Invents Act, any third party “who is not the owner of a 
patent” can challenge the validity of an issued patent using either post-grant review,111 or inter 
partes review by filing a petition with the USPTO.112 The primary objective of the inter partes 
reexamination procedure is to reduce costly patent litigation in US District Courts by providing 
an expanded means for third parties to challenge the validity of a patent.113  
                                                 
100 Article 32 of TRIPS reads: ‘An opportunity for judicial review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent 
shall be available’.  
101 Article 10 of the Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047. Note that the aim of the Patent Law Treaty 
(PLT) is to harmonise and streamline formal procedures in respect of national and regional patent applications 
and patents and, thus, to make such procedures more user friendly. With the significant exception of filing date 
requirements (Article 5), the PLT provides the maximum sets of requirements that the office of a contracting party 
may apply (Article 2). This means that a contracting party is free to provide for requirements that are more 
generous from the viewpoint of applicants and owners, but the requirements under the PLT are mandatory in 
regard to the maximum an office can require from applicants or owners. 
102 WTO/DSU (1997) US – India (1997) WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 59. WTO/DSU (1997) EC – Protection of 
Trademarks (2005) WT/DS174/R, paras. 7.746 & 7.682. 
103 Article 1 of TRIPS in part provides that ‘members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice’. 
104 Okediji and Margo 2014, p. 167. 
105 Merges and Duffy 2013, p. 1039, observing that reexamination proceedings provide an opportunity for the 
USPTO to reconsider the validity of patent claims. 
106 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 2011. 
107 35 USC. §§ 302 and 311. 
108 35 USC. §§ 303 and 312. 
109 § 6(d) of H.R. 1249, 2011. 
110 See, H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, 46–48 (2011). 
111 35 USC. § 321. 
112 35 USC. § 311. 
113 145 Cong. Rec. E1788, at E1789-90. 
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Nevertheless, post-grant review must be initiated within nine (9) months of the issuance of a 
patent, and permits any patentability issue to be raised, which can be based on any evidence, 
and at least one claim of the patent.114 That is, the petition for post-grant review must provide 
evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim,115 except that an inter partes 
review cannot be initiated until the later of nine (9) months after a patent issue or after post-
grant review is complete. Furthermore, inter partes review is limited to the grounds of novelty 
or non-obviousness, and non-patentable subject matter.116 The person challenging the validity 
of the granted patent does not need to show an interest in it,117 and requests may be filed any 
time during the enforceability of a patent after the foregoing period has expired.118 In this case 
the burden of proof is on the challenger due to the jurisdictive notion of the “presumption of 
validity”.119  
 
However, while this legal logic follows the US patent law principle, which says that “patents 
shall be presumed valid”,120 what deviates from the US legal scope is the trial procedure created 
under the American Invents Act.121 In litigation, under 35 U.S.C. § 282, an issued patent is 
“presumed valid”. Accordingly, an invalidity defence in court must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.122 In contrast, in each of the new post-issuance validity proceedings, 
there will be no presumption of validity for patents that are reviewed; thus, invalidity need only 
be established by a preponderance of the evidence.123  Likewise, the new Trial Practice and 
Procedure Rules confirm that ‘the default evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the 
evidence’,124 which is a lower threshold than the clear and convincing evidence standard 
applied to invalidity determinations in litigation.  
 
Under the EU jurisprudence, a notice of opposition may be filed at the European Patent 
Office.125 The post-grant opposition in the EU is more of a post-contentious,126 inter partes, 
administrative127 procedure intended to allow any European patent to be centrally opposed.128 
Opposition proceedings are available to the public.129 More importantly, as per the European 
Patent Convention (EPC),130 any person, natural person or legal entity who is not the patent 
owner can file an opposition to a European patent within nine (9) months of the publication of 
details in the European Patent Bulletin.131 The opposition applies to any European patent in all 
                                                 
114 35 USC. §321(b). 
115 35 USC. § 322(a)(3). 
116 35 USC. § 321(b). See also, 35 USC. § 324(b). 
117 § 302 U.S.C. 35. 
118 Chapter 1901 – Protest under 37 CFR § 1.291 reads: 
[A] protest is literally a protest against the application for a patent. It is designed to bring 
information to the attention of the USPTO that is relevant to avoiding the issue of invalid 
patents. 
119 Muir, Brandi-Dohrn and Gruber 2002, p. 216.  
120 35 U.S.C. § 282 
121 H.R. 1249. (Enacted into law. Pub. L. 112-29 [125 Stat. 284 through 125 Stat. 341, 16 September 2011]. 
122  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011).  
123 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (inter partes review), 326(e) (post-grant review, and by extension covered business 
methods). 
124 37 CFR § 42.1(d). 
125 Paterson 2001, p. 193.  
126 Enlarged Board of Appeal (1994) Decision G 0009/93, Reasons for the Decision, item 1. 
127 Enlarged Board of Appeal (1992) Decision G 0008/91, Reasons, point 7. 
128 Article 99(1) EPC. 
129 Subject to some exceptions in Rule 144 EPC. See, Article 128(4) EPC. 
130 “Convention on the Grant of European Patent” 1973. 
131 Article 99(1) EPC. 
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contracting states in which the said patent has effect.132 Significantly, an opposition may be 
filed by a straw man to hide the identity of the party actually interested in having the patent 
revoked.133 A straw man is ‘a party acting on behalf of another person’.134  
 
In 1999, the Enlarged Board of Appeal held that the use of a straw man did not render the 
opposition inadmissible unless ‘the involvement of the opponent is to be regarded as 
circumventing the law by abuse of process’.135 As provided by Article 100 of the EPC, the 
opposition must at least be based on one ground for opposition,136 accompanied by evidence 
that supports the grounds for opposition.137 The following grounds are available for interested 
parties to trigger: the subject-matter of the patent is not patentable;138 the invention is not 
sufficiently disclosed to allow a person skilled in the art to carry it out; and the content of the 
patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed or, the patent was granted on a 
divisional application or on a new application filed under Article 61, beyond the content of the 
earlier application as filed.139  
 
According to Article 101 of the EPC, if the opposition is admissible,140 the Opposition Division 
shall examine whether at least one ground for opposition under Article 100 prejudices the 
maintenance of the European patent.141 Decisions of the Opposition Divisions are subject to 
appeal to the EPO Board of Appeal.142 Moreover, decisions to reject an opposition as 
inadmissible are also subject to appeal to the EPO Board of Appeal.143 The opposition rate 
before the EPO is consistently higher in the closest available proxy for the pharmaceutical 
sector than it is in organic chemistry and all other sectors (overall EPO average). In 2015, 
overall, 2417 new opposition cases were filed in the EPO, with 1202 (inter partes) representing 
52.6 per cent of patents opposed.144 
 
IV. Justifying the Patent Opposition Mechanisms 
 
The theory that justifies the granting of a patent is based on the “incentive to create”.145 The 
principal basis of this incentive is to provide adequate compensation for the patentee.146 This 
occurs by rewarding inventors with the right to try and exclude others from commercially 
exploiting their patented invention for a specific period147 by taking two steps that they 
                                                 
132 id. 
133 Technical Board of Appeal. T 0022/09 (Party status/Fischer-Tropsch Catalysts/SASOL Technology) Reasons 
for the Decision, 2. European Patent Office, 21 June 2013. 
134 Stauder and Singer 2003, p. 95. 
135 Enlarged Board of Appeal. Decisions G 0003/97 and G 0004/97 (OJ 21 January 1999, 245, 270. Headnote 
1(a), 1(b)) that the opponent is the person who fulfils the requirements of Article 99(1) in conjunction with Article 
100, Rules 76 and 77(1) EPC (former Rules 55 and 56(1)) EPC 1973.  
136 See also, Rule 76(2)(c) EPC.  
137 Rule 76 EPC. 
138 Articles 52 to 57, patentable inventions, exceptions to patentability, novelty, non-prejudicial disclosures, 
inventive step, industrial application. 
139 WIPO, SCP/14/5 2009, para. 67. 
140 Rule 77 of the Implementing Regulation to the EPC provides grounds for a rejection of the opposition as 
inadmissible. 
141 Fox 2007, p. 104. See also, Dowie-Whybrow 2013, p. 344. 
142 Article 106 EPC and Rule 99 EPC. 
143 Article 106 EPC. See, Rules 77 and 99 EPC. 
144 “Annual Report of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO” 2015. 
145 Hovenkamp et al. 2002, pp. 1-2, § 1.1. Harmon 2002, p. 22, § 1.4(b). 
146 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 1014. 
147 Article 33 of TRIPS provides for 20-years patent term. See also, WIPO 2005, “Guide to Using Patent 
Information”, p. 4. 
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probably would not otherwise take: to invent in the first instance, and to reveal information to 
the public about these inventions.148 This ensures that socially important products that, but for 
a patent, never would have been developed or would have been developed at a markedly slower 
pace, actually materialise or emerge at an accelerated speed.149 While patents have been found 
to be significant in themselves as a component of the market value for economic growth, it is 
also true that the same can sometimes undermine public interests if there are not adequate 
safeguards. Therefore, even the firmest advocates of the patent system must sometimes 
acknowledge that the legitimacy of the same relies upon two principal conditions.  
 
First, it requires that valid patents be granted. Second, it necessitates that questionable patents 
be revoked or reduced to their proper scope. This is because the value that patent law provides 
society lies in stimulating original invention and rewarding the same with exclusive rights. As 
a matter of public policy, a patent must contain a non-obvious technical contribution to the 
state of the art, whereby a technical problem is solved by technical means,150 and innovation 
and technological advancement are best served when an inventor is issued a patent with the 
scope of protection that is deserved. Therefore, resolving the issue of what is questionable 
should be a desirable feature of every serious patent system.151 The opposition mechanism 
offers the opportunity to reduce the risk of patents being granted without sufficient scrutiny or 
to ensure that only innovations with valuable technology are worthy of receiving exclusive 
protection under patent law.152 That is, the general patent policy in this direction seeks to ensure 
that the Patent Office does not grant, and the courts do not uphold, invalid patents. As stated 
already, opposition proceedings are conducted before the Patent Office,153 and the purpose of 
this is to give opponents, such as competitors, the opportunity to challenge the validity of 
patents.154  
 
This mechanism provides an additional, administrative layer of review, which is simpler than 
a court procedure or a quasi-judicial procedure.155 To add to that, opposition proceedings have 
a shorter timeline and the involvement of technical experts who are well-suited to navigate the 
complex scientific concepts embodied in patents.156 It is also noted for being cost-effective, as 
the procedure is a departure from the strictly formal set up of a court of law.157 Uncertainty 
about the validity of a patent has several potential socio-economic costs. First, low quality 
patents can create considerable uncertainty among inventors or would-be commercialisers of 
inventions, which in turn can slow either the pace of innovation or investment in the 
commercialisation of new technologies.158 Aside from being technically invalid,159 
                                                 
148 Burk and Lemley 2003, pp. 1581–1582. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
149 Adelman et al. 2003, pp. 28-29.  
150 Cook 2002, p. 179. 
151 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 992. 
152 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, pp. 56-57, para. 198. See, Kesan 2008 (ed.) by Takenaka, p. 262. Graham and 
Harhoff 2006, p. 1. 
153 WIPO, SCP/14/5 2009, para. 12.  
154 Enlarged Board of Appeal. Decision G 0009/93, 6 July 1994, Reasons, point 3. 
155 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, p. 57, para. 198. 
156 Turchyn 2016, p. 1499.  
157 Levin and Levin 2003, p. 132. Shi 2003, p. 440-41, observing that patentees, in fact, have filed many of the 
reexaminations to provide newly discovered prior art to the Patent Office and pre-empt competitors’ validity 
challenges. See also, “Amending Patent and Trademark Law” 1989, 20 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, para. 6463. 
158 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 992. 
159 FTC Report 2003, p. 5, a poor quality or questionable patent is one that is likely invalid or contains claims that 
are overly broad. 
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commentators have argued that such patents are worthless160 and burdensome on the patent 
system,161 particularly in regard to the issue of unnecessary litigation.162 It has been proposed 
in one sense that litigation as a socially optimal instrument for nullifying questionable patents 
is insufficient.163  
 
One empirical study has suggested that roughly half of all litigated patents are found to be 
invalid, including some of great commercial significance.164 The core insight along this 
premise is that very few patents are litigated, and even when litigation is initiated, most cases 
settle without hearing.165 Reasoning in ideal terms, the risk that a patent will be declared invalid 
is substantial because the amount a party is willing to spend on litigation closely correlates 
with that party’s probability of winning an invalidity contest.166 For opponents in financially 
weaker positions, the effects of such a system are even more acute because of the ever-
increasing costs of litigation.167 Therefore, the party with the deepest pocket is the one most 
likely to receive a favourable validity ruling.168 This contention is relevant given the empirical 
evidence suggesting that litigation by individuals and the government on patent validity is 
rare.169  
 
Added to the foregoing is the practical viewpoint that fear of litigation may cause smaller 
entrant firms to avoid areas where incumbents hold large numbers of patents.170 Such entry-
avoidance may be rational and even welfare-enhancing if the incumbents’ patents are known 
for certain to be valid, but low quality patents held by incumbents may also deter entry into a 
technological area if the cost of invalidating the patents is too high. In these circumstances, 
technological alternatives may not be commercialised and consumer welfare suffers.171 This 
may also slow the pace of innovation in fields characterised by cumulative invention, in which 
one inventor’s efforts rely on previous technical advances or advances in complementary 
technologies.172 The key problem is “evergreening”.173 If these previous technical advances are 
covered by patents of questionable validity, the costs to inventors of pursuing inventions that 
rely on them may be so high as to discourage such cumulative invention.174  
 
This will eventually increase uncertainty among inventors concerning the level of protection 
enjoyed by these related inventions, which in turn will make it more costly and difficult for 
inventors to build on these related inventions in their own technical advances.175 Following the 
foregoing logic, it is safe to argue for a self-checking mechanism in the market, where patents 
                                                 
160 Kitch 1990, pp.122-123, stating that most issued patents are worthless, or very nearly worthless. Merges 1999, 
p. 603, observing that most patented technologies will not be economically successful. 
161 Seymore 2013, p. 991. Thomas 2002, p. 731. 
162 Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, p. 140. 
163 Williams 2006, Parts IV. B.1. 
164 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 76. 
165 id. 
166 Farrell and Merges 2004, p. 949. 
167 ibid. p. 948, stating that an infringement case now costs roughly $2 million for each party when there is $1 
million to $25 million at risk. 
168 Williams 2006, Parts IV. B.1.a. 
169 Farrell and Shapiro 2008, p. 1348. 
170 Lerner 1995, pp. 486-487. 
171 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 992. 
172 FTC Report 2003, ch. 2, discussing the effects of patents on “stand-alone” and “follow-on” innovations. 
173 Granstrand 2015, p. 1, defining evergreening as the strategic extension of the duration of a temporary 
monopolistic or market dominant position by means of patent strategies. 
174 FTC Report 2003, p. 15. Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 993. 
175 ibid. p. 3 & 28. 
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that have actual market power are legally challenged by competitors, who are often aware of 
the most relevant prior art and can probe beneath the surface of an applicant’s affidavits and 
declarations.176 More specifically, making firms more vigilant about their competitors’ 
inventions would also encourage the dissemination of information contained in patent 
applications.177 In this vein, parties with superior knowledge could challenge the validity of 
patents.178 Thus, through the participation of third-parties who may be well informed about the 
technology concerned, the opposition procedure would complement the examination procedure 
and increase the credibility of granted patents.179  
 
This is particularly important when individuals may not have the technical ability to supply 
evidence in challenging the validity of a pending or granted patent.180 In this case, the burden 
of searching prior art would shift from the Patent Office to the inventor’s competitors, who are 
likely to have better information.181 Relatedly, the system could help educate examiners in 
issues presented by emerging technologies.182 Because third parties are likely to have more 
knowledge of prior art in new fields, opposition proceedings could uncover areas unknown to 
examiners.183 This mechanism could be used to target the most valuable patents; that is, 
patented inventions that are most likely to have an effect in the market are most likely to be 
opposed.184 Moreover, the granting of questionable patents is also likely to spur significant 
increases in patent applications, further straining the already overburdened examination 
processes of the Patent Office.185  
 
A vicious circle may result, in which cursory examinations of patent applications result in the 
issue of questionable patents, which triggers a rapid swelling in applications, further exhausting 
the limited resources of the Patent Office, and eventually limiting the examination of individual 
applications, and further degrading the quality of patents.186 Thus, the benefits of avoiding 
highly uncertain patents are sufficiently great that every patent regime must consider them.187 
In other words, since invalidating a patent provides a public good, typically to the benefit of 
competitors and consumers, one can naturally consider policies to enhance this regime.188 This 
point reflects the theoretical view that at the heart of every successful IP system lies an 
elementary legal foundation that the patent system operates to promote the fundamental interest 
of the public.189 Importantly, while the current patent regime marked a new era of obligations 
regarding the protection and enforcement of patent rights, WTO members retained important 
policy options, including the right to protect their public interests.  
 
                                                 
176 Hall and Harhoff 2004, pp.1014-1015.  
177 Gallini 2002, p. 148. 
178 Graham and Harhoff 2006, p. 1. 
179 WIPO, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 2008, 57, para. 198. 
180 Enlarged Board of Appeal. Decision G 0009/93, 6 July 1994, Reasons, point 3. 
181 Graham and Harhoff 2006, p.  6. 
182 Levin and Levin 2003, p. 140. 
183 id. 
184 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 1006. Graham et al. 2003 (eds.) by Cohen and Merrill, p. 114. Harhoff and Reitzig 
2004, p. 478. 
185 Hall and Harhoff 2004, p. 993. 
186 ibid. p. 994. 
187 Gallini 2002, p. 148. 
188 Lemley and Shapiro 2005, p. 90. 
189 Mercurio and Tyagi, 2010, p. 281. 
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Therefore, the public interest norm, a principle on which the granting of patents rests, is 
captured by several provisions under TRIPS.190 For example, the TRIPS Agreement 
unreservedly expresses the intent that the scope and patent form should be defined in a way 
that promotes the public interest.191 Thus, the overriding objective of the public interest norm 
under TRIPS suggests that the meaning of the rule of law therein should conform to the 
underlying socio-economic welfare of the people, and that the Agreement was designed to 
serve, particularly, what is best for the national interest.192 Within this spirit, Article 8 of TRIPS 
allows member states to use their discretion when formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, and to adopt measures necessary to protect the public interest.193 This primarily 
follows Article 8(2) of TRIPS, which envisages that such private rights stand to be abused by 
the right-holders, and this will be detrimental to the legitimate public interest.194  
 
In fact, the wider discretion afforded to members to protect the public interest is established on 
the territorial foundation of patent law; that is, an internationally recognised norm that is 
qualified by several clauses under TRIPS.195 Despite the common standards agreed upon by 
WTO members to protect patents the territorial foundation of patent law is intact, and TRIPS 
did not destroy this norm. This principle is grounded in the notion that every government has 
sovereignty within its borders or territories on patent law matters.196 Thus, in relation to the 
principle of territoriality, and also subject to national treatment and the most favoured nation 
clause,197 the scope of protection of a patent right is limited to the territory of the state where 
the right is granted, and justifies, for example, exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities of the 
granting state with respect to questions related to the validity of rights conferred and their 
limitations.198  
 
Without any recourse for effective mechanisms to challenge the validity of patents, the public 
interest, a principle centrally established in the patent system, may be undermined. The 
opposition mechanism supports the conceptual viewpoint that granting patents without an 
effective quality control mechanism could potentially lead to negative spill-over effects on 
competition and innovation, not to mention adverse effects on economic growth.199 That is, to 
say, a reasonable principle along this line would certainly have several merits including 
preventing a patent holder from enjoying a wrongful monopoly over a questionable patent to 
the detriment of the public.200 The conclusion drawn from the failure of WTO members to 
explicitly include any operative provisions in relation to the patent opposition mechanism is 
firstly, an indication that individual members can exercise a certain amount of appropriate 
discretion on the subject, and secondly, such a national action will be consistent and legitimate 
under WTO jurisprudence, and nothing in the light of TRIPS will, in fact, preclude the 
possibility of any country cleaning the patent system. 
 
                                                 
190 Reichman 1995, p. 352, stating that TRIPS rules reflect compromise efforts to balance private and public 
interests. 
191 Article 8. 
192 UNCTAD Reports: TD/B/COM.2/CLP/10, 1999, para. 28.  
193 UNCTAD-ICTSD: Resource Book on TRIPS 2005, p. 546. 
194 Section 8 of TRIPS, dubbed “control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences.” Article 40(2) allows 
members to adopt relevant legislation to prevent abuse of patent rights. See, Carvalho, 2010, p. 204. 
195 See, Articles 8, 31, 40. 
196 Ladas 1957, p. 400. 
197 Evans, 1999, p. 714. 
198 Abbott, Cottier and Gurry 2011, p. 602. 
199 Puasiri 2013, p. 220.  
200 Manu 2015, p. 421. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the need for states without any legal instruments to challenge the 
validity of patents to implement patent opposition mechanisms to mitigate the potential 
consequences of granting questionable patents. This is because while a great deal of importance 
is placed on the act of obtaining a patent itself, sometimes the necessity of checking the validity 
of patents remains less appreciated in certain countries, where the patent practice has focused 
extensively on the granting of patents rather than anything else. The need for a post-grant 
opposition mechanism seeks to reverse this, and is more supportive of the viewpoint that good 
patents are those with social value that promote the public interest. Put differently, the patent 
opposition mechanism is one central instrument whose normative foundation extolls the 
legislative wisdom requiring that the overriding public interest in the patent system is protected, 
since invalidly granted patents may potentially prejudice the same. That is, as an essential 
hallmark of the patent system, a potentially vital principle on which the granting of patent rights 
sits underlines the virtues that the patent system has always been to promote rather than to 
impede protection of the public interest.201 
 
This view then destroys the accounts of patent advocates who have often concluded, without 
the benefit of evidence, that more patents are better for society even if they are weak.202 
Therefore, under the conceptual purview that the principal basis for granting patents embodies 
a utilitarian character,203 a strong theme in this article has been premised on the argument that 
citizens in whose interests patents are granted have the right to participate in the patent system 
and to check that only inventions that fall within the fundamental interests of the public deserve 
exclusive rights. Consequently, drawing on the jurisprudence containing substantive law and 
procedural requirements within the EPO and USPTO pursuant to patent opposition 
proceedings, it has been shown that if WTO members without patent opposition mechanisms 
were to explore and strengthen their regimes, citizens, competitors and other interest groups 
would be able to detect and invoke key provisions to challenge invalid patents while ensuring 
that the patent system is untainted and free of questionable claims for patents.  
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